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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF
CLAUDIUS WALLICH,
deceased,
FRED R. W ALLI CH
Petitioner and Appellant,
vs.
A. C. vV ALLI CH, et al
Cross-Petitioner and
Respondents.

Case No.
10569

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
FACTS
On Feb. 5, 1959 Walker Bank and Trust Company, the Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Claudius Wallich, deceased, filed its petition for settlement of its first and final account
and for distribution.
Said petition with respect to the residue of
said estate in paragraph ( q) R 29 provided:
"To Fred R. Wallich, all of the rest,
residue and remainder ... to be held and used
by him in his discretion in accordance with
and pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
8 of the will of the deceased."
1

On Feb. 18, 1959, the appellant, Fred R. Wallich, stipulated with A. C. Wallich, one of the respondents herein.
"E. Ordering that all the rest, residue
and remainder of the property now on hand
for distribution as is in said petition set
forth to be distributed and delivered to Freel
R. "\Vallich as set forth in said petition."
R 50
On Feb. 24, 1959, the residue of said estate
was distributed, said order in part providing:
"And the same is hereby distributed to
Fred R. W allich, to be held and used by him
in his discretion in accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 8 of
the will of the deceased." R 62
The reason for the stipulation was that Fred
R. Wallich and A. C. Wallich contested an issue
involving paragraph 7 of the same will. However,
Fred R. Wallich did not contest the issue of distribution in accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 8 of said will, nor did he request construction of the will with respect to said
paragraph 8.
On May 9, 1960 Fred R. Wallich signed and
filed with the court two written instruments which
were signed and sworn to by him under oath. One
was designated a receipt and undertaking and the
other a receipt of distribution.
2

The first one R 199 was as follows:
"I, Fred R. Wallich, do hereby acknowledge from Walker Bank & Trust Company,
Executor under the Last Will and Testament
of Claudius Wallich, deceased, receipt of:
'Three Thousand ( 3,000) shares Crown Zellerbach Corporation, Nevada, $5 par common.
Ctfs. NY 133627 /NY133656 n/o Fred R.
Wallich, Trustee u/w Claudius Wallich, deceased·'

'

under the provisions of the Order of the above
entitled Court made and entered on the 24th
day of February, 1959, to have, hold, administer, and dispose of the same as Testamentary Trustee and pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph eight of the Last \Vill and Testament of said Claudius Wallich, deceased."
The second one R 201
"I, Fred R. W allich, do hereby acknowledge from Walker Bank & Trust Company,
Executor under the Last Will & Testament
of Claudius Wallich, deceased, receipt of:
'Three Thousand ( 3, 000) sh. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, Nevada, $5 par common.
Cts. NY133627 /NY133656 n/o Fred R. Wallich, Trustee 1-l/w Claudius vVallich, deceased;'
to have, hold, administer and dispose of the
same as pursuant to the provisions of paragraph eight of the Last Will & Testament of
said Claudius Wallich, deceased."
R 201 Emphasis above are supplied to demonstrate that appellant erroneously represented to
this Court in his brief that the second receipt did
not contain the word "trustee." It is to be noted
3

that it did, and that Fred R. Wallich under oath
represented that he was trustee under the will of
Claudius Wallich, deceased, in receiving said property.
R 158 Fred R. Wallich in his duly verified
petition represented to the Court that pursuant to
the Court order he received 3,000 shares of Crown
Zellerbach stock evidenced by certificates issued in
the name of "Fred R. W allich, Trustee u/w of
Claudius Wallich, deceased," and that he had taken
the same to the State of California where he resides and,
"It is wholly impossible for him to negotiate, sell, or otherwise dispose of the stock,
thus preventing him from making use of the
stock for the purposes intended by the will
of the deceased."
The Court, without notice of any hearing
thereon, entered its order making a finding that
the stock certificates should be re-issued in the
name of Fred R. Wallich, trustee, without reference to the will of the deceased, for the purpose of
permitting the same to be negotiated by Fred R.
W allich so he could carry out the purposes of the
will. R 161
After the expiration of 5 years after the death
of testator, the time fixed when R. Wallich under
said will was required to distribute the residue of
said trust fund, A. C. Wallich made demand upon
4

said Fred R. W allich to make such distribution. Upon
his ref us al, A. C. W allich commenced an action
against Fred W allich in the Superior Court of California, for the County of Los Angeles to compel Fred
\Vallich to account for and distribute the trust
estate in accordance with paragraph 8 of said will.
After the filing of said action against him in
California, Fred R. W allich did thereafter file his
Petition for Discharge as a Testamentary Trustee
before the lower Court in Utah, and the order made
thereon requiring him to account and distribute is
the basis of this appeal to this Court. The Superior
Court of California determined as fallows:
"If the Utah proceedings are conducted
in good faith and with due diligence, then that
Court may appropriately be recognized by
the California Courts as having primary jurisdiction."
This order was made despite the fact that the petition in Utah was filed only after respondents had
pursued their remedy against Fred R. W allich in
California. See R 292 for the California Memorandum Opinion.
On Aug. 20, 1964, Fred R. Wallich did file his
said petition for Discharge of Testamentary Trustee in the District Court R 226 wherein he did pray,
"E That petitioner be discharged as testamentary trustee pursuant to Section 75-12-32
U. C. A."
In the same petition wherein said Fred R. Wallich
5

t
h e is
. a testamentary trustee, he also asserts
asserl,s
that he is not a testamentary trustee and that all
the property he received was an outright gift to him.

The Court found Fred R. W allich was a testamentary trustee, and ordered him to account and
distribute. R. 312 It is this order appellant appeals
from.
All the above involved the issues now before
this Court. On a prior case before this Court, A. C.
vVallich, one of the respondents, and Fred Wallich
appellant, were before this Court on a case involving paragraph 7 of this same will.
In another issue the trial involving paragraph
7 of this same will, Fred R. W allich did represent
to the District Court in a brief filed, that he was
the testamentary trustee under paragraph 8 of said
will, and that he could be called upon to make contributions to the beneficiaries named under said
paragraph 8 of said will to meet emergencies.
Said bri~f is contained in the packet marked
R 357 and on Page 4 of said brief is contained the
following direct quote, which is word for word as
counsel for Fred R. Wallich represented it to the
Court. The part in parenthesis is a direct quote from
Paragraph 8 of the will now being considered, and
was suplied by Fred R. Wallich to the court:
"Therefore, inasmuch as the decedent was
leaving the residue in trust with Fred R.
W allich (to meet any emergencies that may
6

arise in, and for the use and benefit of the
Wallich family, that is, my blood relations
regardless of their degree of kindred or re~
lationship to me.) Fred R. Wallich would be
most likely called upon to make further contributions for the support of Minnie after the
exhausting of the $10,000.00." R 357
See also R 95 where under sworn testimony
Fred R. W allich asserted and his counsel stated
that "there is $150,000.00 in that residuary trust."
This is the very trust that they now deny existed.
A. C. W allich prevailed in said case and Fred
R. W allich appealed the order to the Supreme Court,
Case No. 9144, a photostat of the first page of said
brief is attached to the first cover page of this brief,
showing Fred R. W allich a second time represented
to the Supreme Court that he was "trustee of the
residuary estated under the will of Claudius Wallich, deceased." Said case is reported at 350 P 2d
614, 10 u 2d 192.
On page 6 of appellants brief he refers to an
ex parte order R 217. This is not an order within
the pleadings or issues before this Court. Said ex
parte order entered without notice involved a fund
held by the executor as a stakeholder involving the
issue of who was entitled to such fund under paragraph 7 of said will.
The issue before this Court involves the order
R 62, concerning whether paragraph 8 of the will
is incorporated in said order, and other facts as
herein later related.
7

Fred R. "\Vallich now petitions the court to discharge him as a testamentary trustee pursuant to
Sec. 75-12-32 U.C.A., and in the very same petition
alleges that he is not a trustee and that all the residue of the estate was an outright gift to him personally.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION
BUTED "IN PURSUANCE OF AND
THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAST
DECEDENT" INCORPORATED THE
DECREE.

WHICH DISTRIACCORDING TO
WILL OF SAID
WILL INTO THE

The above point is taken word for word from
No. 5 in the Lockhart case hereinafter cited.
On Feb. 24, 1959, the residue of said estate was
distributed, said order in part providing:
" ... And the same is hereby distributed to
Fred R. W allich, to be held and used by him
in his discretion in accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 8 of
the Will of the deceased." R 62
Without exception, the cases all hold that on
phrases wherein the Court distributes property "in
accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of
a will," that the decree incorporates said provisions
of said will in said decree as fully as though copied
into said decree word for word.
Appellant cites the case of Miller vs. Walker,
404 P 2d 675. This case is not in point for the reason
8

that in the Walker
the property to the
decree "to be held
with and pursuant
________ of said Will."

case the court distributed all of
widow and did not state in said
and used by her in accordance
to the provisions of Paragraph

A review of the cases demonstrates that Parag1·aph 8 was incorporated in said decree as fully
as though it was set forth therein word for word.
The part of the opinion in the Lockhart case quoted
below which is set forth in caps is so set forth because it is italicized in the written opinion by the
Court. The emphasis is not added by respondent.
The obvious purpose of the emphasis is to clearly
demonstrate that by the use of precisely the same
phrase the courts hold that the will is incorporated
in to the decree.
HENRY LOCKHART vs. CRAIL
69 P 2d 1001 Cal.
''IN PURSUANCE OF AND ACCORDING
TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAST
WILL OF SAID DECEASED."
''The court may, by express terms or by apt
reference thereto, incorporate the will in the
decree so as to cons ti tu te it a portion of its
distributive terms and make it a part of the
decree as effectually as though set forth in
it. When necessity arises thereafter to construe the decree, it is the duty of the court
to look to the will to ascertain the terms of distribution. Horton v. Winbigler, 175 Cal. 149,
165 P. 423. If the will, by apt reference, is
made part of the decree, it supplies matters
9

which it contains but the decree omits. In re
Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448, 108 P. 287.
While the will cannot be used to impeach the
decree, it can be used to explain it where the
decree taken alone is uncertain, vague, and
ambiguous. This rule has been applied both
where the decree ref erred to the will (in re
Ewer's Will, 177 Cal. 660, 171 P. 683; Fraser
v. Carman-Ryles (Cal. Sup.) 64 P. 2d 397),
and where it did not. McCloud v. Hewlett,
135 Cal. 361, 67 P. 333. The decree does not
appear to be uncertain or ambiguous in respect to each child's ultimate share, for it
clearly provides that each child shall receive
as a conditional legacy, one-sixth of the principal of the trust estate, and as a residuary
legacy one-third of the property then in trust,
at the termination of the trust. But the decree
does omit the provision of the will that each
child was to receive ultimately one-third of the
entire trust estate.Phrases identically worded to the above-italidzed portion of the present decree have been held to incorporate the
will into the decree. Horton v. Winbigler,
supra; In re Ewer's Will, supra. The will,
therefore, was properly admitted, and the
judgment in so far as it distributed one-third
of the entire estate to the assignees is correct.''
In the above-captioned case, the court points
out that the decree did not state specifically that
each child was ultimately to receive the entire trust
estate. In the case at bar, the decree does not state
that the heirs of the Wallich family are to have
distributed to them by right of representation, all
10

of the residue remaining. However, the will so recites, and being incorporated into the decree it is
not contradicting the decree but merely in aid of it
as the rationale of the cases indicate must be done.
SHATTUCK ~. SHATTUCK
192 P 2d 229 Ariz.
"2 It is generally held also that a will may
not be used to impeach a decree of final distribution, but may be used only in aid of it.
Keating v. Smith, 154 Cal. 186, 97 P. 300; In
re Gardiner's Estate, supra; In re Easter's
Estate, supra; Tacoma Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Nadham, 14 Wash. 2d 576, 128 P. 2d 982

"

"3 An apt reference to the terms of the will,
as was made in the instant case, has the effect of incorporating the will into the decree
and of merging the one into the other as fully
as though copied into it verbatim. Goad v.
Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552, 51 P. 681, 63 Am.
St. Rep. 145; Greenwood v. Murray, 26 Minn.
259, 2 N.W. 945." Emphasis supplied.
CLARK vs. CAPITAL NAT. BANK
206 p 2d 16
'''It is ordinarily true that a final decree of
distribution of property is final and conclusive upon the heirs, devisees and legatees, and
that the terms of the will may not be used to
impeach the clear and unambiguous terms of
the decree of distribution. But certainly when
the decree specifically refers to the will, as it
does in the present case, it may be used to
11

clarify and explain the distributive terms of
the decree ... "
" '* * * But while the will cannot be used
to impeach the decree, it can be used to explain it where the decree taken alone is uncertain, vague, or ambiguous.' ... "
"If the will, by apt reference, is made part
of the decree, it supplies matters which it
contains but the decree omits . . . "
"The decree actually distributed the fund to
the named trustee, to be administered 'in
accordance and subject to the terms of paragraph Ninth of the Will of said deceased,
to which reference is hereby made.' (Italics
added.)"
POINT II.
WHERE A DECREE WHICH HAS INCORPORATED A PART OF A WILL THEREIN HAS BECOME
FINAL ONE GIVING A RECEIPT FOR PROPERTY AS
A TRUSTEE MAY NOT REOPEN SAID DECREE TO
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION THEREOF AS A PERSONAL
GIFT OF SAID PROPERTY TO HIM.

Said Decree of Distribution was made and entered Sept. 24, 1959. No appeal was taken therefrom and as made and provided under 75-1-7; 751-8; 75-11-37; 75-14-12 U.C.A. 1953 said probate
decree was final and conclusive, particularly where
appellant stipulated to the entry of said decree and
received the residue under his sworn statement as
a trustee.
cree.

The cases also hold he may not reopen said de12

Miller vs. Walker Bank & Trust Company
17 u 2d 88
404 p 2d 675
~'The probate of the estate was a proceeding
m rem ~nd the decree. after the time for appeal expired became fmal and conclusive and
is not subject to attack, except for fraud.
See also in re: Rice Estate 182 P 2d 111 111 U 428, and in re: Latsis estate 284 P 2d
479 ________ u ________ ,

POINT III.
THE CARDINAL RULE FOR INTERPRETATION
OF WILLS IS TO LOOK TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE
WILL TO DETERMINE THE PURPOSE AND INTENT
OF THE TESTATOR.

This point is a direct quote from W allich vs.
W allich, 350 P 2d 614 where this Court considered
Paragraph 7 of this same will.
Even though said decree is final and may not
be re-opened for construction, nevertheless, if it were
to be construed, the lower court should be affirmed.
An analysis of Paragraph 8 now before this court
is best demonstrated by taking a paragraph at a
time with emphasis supplied as fallows:
". . . I hereby give, devise and bequeath to
my said nephew, Fred R. W allich, son of my
deceased brother, Julius C. Wallich, in trust,
nevertheless, to be held and used by him in his
sole and absolute discretion and without restriction or control of any kind whatsoever,

"

The cases hold that the use of the word "trust
13

compels a separation of legal estate and beneficial
enjoyments.
See Sand vs. Church of Assension 30 A 2d 771:
"A trust cannot exist where the same person
possesses both legal estate and beneficial enjoyment since there must be a separation of
legal estate from beneficial enjoyment in order
to create a trust."
Also King vs. Richardson 136 F 2d 849:
"A trust arises when property is given to one
with direction that it be used and applied for
the benefit of another."
Pratt vs. Board of Education 63 NE 2d 275:
"A trust is in the nature of a deposition by
which a proprietor tr an sfers to another the
property of the subject entrusted not that it
should remain with him, but that it should
be applied for the benefit of a third person.
A trust is an obligation arising out of confidence reposed in a person for another's
benefit, to apply property faithfully and according to such confidence."
Consolves vs. H odgsen 237 P 2d 656:
"There is always a dividend ownership of
property to which trustee has legal title and
cestui an equitable title."
The nomenclature used in legal drafting of trust
instruments by skilled draftsmen is generally the
same as contained in the portion above quoted, towit:
"In trust nevertheless to be held and used by
him."
14

It is also significant that the will provides it

is to be held and used. Also, "in his sole discretion"
signifies that he has legal title to the trust estate
for the use and benefit of the beneficiaries, and the
words further signify a trust relationship. The law
defines "discretion" as follows:
Menit vs. Kinini 157 P 2d 989:
"Discretion does not mean power of free
decision or right to pursue an undirected
course. The discretion is one regulated by
well known and established principles of law
and equity."
Stallard vs. Johnson 116 P 2d 965:
"Not arbitrary which will permit the trustee
to defeat the purposes of said trust under
guise of its exercise."
In re: Wilkin 75 NE 1105:
"Discretion vested in the trustee never excuses bad faith.''
Moreover, since the word "trust" signifies a
separation of legal title and beneficial use, the position of Fred R. W allich in aserting that he is the
sole owner is repugnant and inconsistent to the use
of the word, "trust."

The intention of the testator in the use to which
said trust fund was to be put for a 5-year period
is further shown in said paragraph 8 of said will
as follows:
". . . as a reserve to meet any emergencies
that may arise in, and for the use and bene15

fit of, the vVallich family, that is, my blood
relations, regardless of their degree of kindred or relationship to me:"

Again, the choicest nomenclature used by
draftsmen in preparation of trusts is the use of
the phrase, "use and benefit of" and it is impossible for testator to more clearly express his intention
to limit the use of said trust fund to meet emergencies for the Wallich family, that is, the blood
relations of the \Vallich family.
Thereafter, continuing on in said Paragraph 8,
it provides :
". . . said fund, and income therefrom, to be
held and used by my said nephew until his
death or for a period of 5 years after the date
of my death, whichever shall first occur."
Again, this demonstrates the intent of testator
that there be a fund and the period during which
the trustee should use said trust fund exclusively
to meet emergencies for the Wallich family, which
use is for a limited purpose for a limited period.
Continuing on in said Will:
" ... and upon the occurrence of such event,
my said nephew, or in the event of h~s de~th
prior to 5 years after my death, h1s wife,
Loretta W allich, who shall act as successor
trustee without bond, shall distribute any part
of the trust fund that may be then on hand. to
1ny heirs at law then living, upon the prmciple of representations."
16

This portion of Paragraph 8 is very significant
since it would be impossible for testator to more
clearly express the fact that there was to be a trust
fund to be administered since it provides for a successor trustee, should said Fred W allich die and
further provides that said succesor trustee should
act without bond, signifying that otherwise there
would be a trust fund requiring a bond of the trustee; and then the most significant words of all,
"shall distribute any part of trust fund that may
then be on hand." How could the testator more
clearly express his intention that there be a trust
fund to be distributed than he did in using the words
above written?
Moreover, the parties who were to participate
in said trust fund were defined and definitely fixed
by the testator.
The last Paragraph in Paragraph 8 of said
Will provides:
"My said nephew in the administration
of the trust herein imposed upon him shall
act with01lt the necessity of furnishing any
bond or any other security, and without the
necessity of making any accounting of any
nature whatsoever to any person or party
concerning the administration of his trust."
Again, the phrase, "administration of the trust
herein imposed upon him" is very significant and
clearly shows testator's intention.
See Mefford vs. LC1mkin 77 NE 960.
17

"Administration of estates implies such a
complete disposition of them as to not only
collect assets from, but to place them in the
hands of creditors, legatees or to distribute
them to whom after undergoing the process
of administration they finally belong."
"Of the estate herein imposed upon him" are
the choicest words possible to indicate testator's intention that Fred R. Wallich did have a trust imposed upon him and that it was a trust under which
he would ordinarily be required to have a bond,
as is signified by the use of the words, "shall act
without the necessity of furnishing any bond or
other security." Moreover, ''and without the necessity of making an accounting of any nature whatsoever to any person or any party concerning the
administration of this trust" indicates that the testator intended that there was a fiduciary relationship between Fred R. Wallich and the beneficiaries,
which requires an accounting. See also the latter
part of this brief wherein it is indicated that it is
against public policy to attempt to relieve a trustee
from the responsibility of an accounting. Most significant is the fact that the Will did not relieve
Fred R. Wallich from accounting "to the Court"
which is the very issue now before this court.
The nomenclature used in the case. at bar peculiar to a creation of a trust and which demonstrates
testator's intention to create a trust is as follows:
1.

The word "trust" is used once.
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1

2.
3.
4.

The words "to be held" is used twice.
The word "used" is used three times.
The word "discretion" is used once.

5. The phrase "for the use and benefit of"
is used once.
6. "Administration of the trust herein imposed upon him" is used once.

once.

7.

"Succesor trustee" is used once.

8.
9.

"Act without bond" is used twice.
"Trust fund" is used once.

10.

"Administration of his trust" is used

11.

"Accounting" is used once.

In addition to the above, under his sworn statement Fred Wallich filed with the court a receipt
of distribution and an undertaking on distribution
and upon his oath stated and represented to the
court as follows:
12. Used the terms "trustee under the will
of Claudius W allich, deceased" twice.
13. "To have, hold, administer and dispose
of the same as pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Last Will and Testament of Claudius
Wallich, deceased" once.
14. "Under the provisions of the court order
of the 24th day of February, 1959" once.
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15. "To have, hold, administer and dispose of
same as testamentary trustee and pursuant to the
provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Last Will anq,
Testament of said Claudius "\Vallich, deceased," is
used once.
Last, but not least and most significant is the
following mandate from the Utah legislature:
74-2-11 "Technical words in a will are to be
taken in their technical sense, unles the context clearly indicates a contrary intention."
Under this statute the word "trust" is repugnant
to an outright gift to the party and the other technical words make it very clear that a trust was intended, and a gift to Fred Wallich was neither
made nor intended.
74-2-9 ''The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression some effect rather than one which
will render any of the expressions inoperative."
If the words of the will a.re to be given some

effect rather than to render the expression inoperative, how can the appellant in good faith claim the
fund as his own?
Since words are to be taken in the technical
sense and the petition and order used said words
"pursuant to" the following cases define what the
word "pursuant" means.
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Brotherhood vs. Ralway Express 238 F 2d 181
at 184:
"As correctly held by the District Court, "pursuant' means 'in conformity to.' "
First Central Trust vs. Claffin 73 NE 2d 238
m a wills case the court held :
"15 Pursuant is defined as 'agreeable to or
in conformity with.' It means 'in a similar
manner or by like methods.' ''
POINT IV.
74-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 A WILL IS TO BE CONSTRUED
ACCORDING 'TO THE INTENTION OF 'THE TESTATOR, WHERE HIS INTENTION CANNOT HAVE EFFECT TO ITS FULL EXTENT IT MUST HA VE EFFECT
AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.

While counsel for respondent takes the position that the decree is final, and is not ambiguous,
nevertheless should the court be inclined to construe
the will, which is incorporated into the decree, counsel invites the court's attention to the fact that the
point above is copied word for word from the statute.
In re: Dewey's Estate 143 P 124, 45 U 98. This
is a leading case cited by the Supreme Court of
Utah, in re: Efferson's Estate 259 P 920. It is also
also quoted at great length in re: Davies' Estate
56 P 2d 586, also in 41 NW 29 and many other
cases as disclosed from Shephard's Citator.
In Re: Dewey's Estate
143 p 124 45 u 98
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"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to the said
Hubbard Tuttle, Sr. It is my desire that he
shall distribute the same, or the proceeds
thereof, among my nephews and nieces, and
to such of them, and in such proportions, as
he shall deem just and proper, and his decision
upon such matters shall be final, conclusive
and binding upon all parties."
"* * * One rule, which we think may be said
to be of universal application, is to the effect
that no particular words are necessary to create a trust, and that if from all the language
used by the testator in his will, a trust is fairly implied, the courts will enforce the same."
"For technical language of course is not necessary to create a trust. It is enough that the intention is apparent."
It is to be observed that the Dewey case had
only one word in it that would indicate an intention
to create a trust and that one word was "distribute."
The word "trust" does not appear in said will. The
Dewey case has many other significant citations
from texts that show the length to which the court
will go to carry out the intention of the testator.
POINT V.
ONE WHO SEEKS DISCHARGE OF A TESTAMENTARY TRUSTEE MUST ACCOUNT AND COMPLY WITH THE DECREE BEFORE ME CAN BE DISCHARGED.

Fred R. W allich invoked the jurisdiction of the
lower court to be discharged as a testamentary
trustee under 75-12-32 U.C.A., which statute he
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plead. See Paragraph ( e) of his petition R 230.
75-12-32
"Agents, special administrators, trustee Final settlements, - section 75-12-19 and 7512-20 relating to final settlements shall apply
to agents, special administrators and trustees,
and to the estates administered by them."
75-12-19
"Discharge of personal representative. When the estate has been fully administered,
and it is shown by the executor or administrator, by the production of satisfactory
vouchers, that he has paid all sums of money
due fr01n hi1n, and delivered under the order
of the court all the property of the estate to
the parties entitled, and perf onned all the
acts lawfully required of him, the court must
make a judgment or decree discharging him
from all liability to be incurred thereafter."
Emphasis supplied.
Bearing in mind the fact that the law governing the final discharge of executors and administrators is applicable to trustees by statute, the following Utah cases show that Fred R. Wallich must account to the court, produce vouchers and distribute
the residue as provided for under the said trust in
order to receive his discharge. This is what the lower
court has ordered since it is mandatory under the
statute.
In re: Brooks Estate 30 P 2d 1065 83 U 506
~~The duties of an administrator are not fully
performed until he has not only accounted for
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but distributed as ordered by the court all
of the assets of the estate ... "
Ehrngren vs. Grolund 57 P at 269 190 U 411:
"The executor could not obtain his discharge
so as to release the sureties on the bond until
he has complied with the decree."
Moreover, in the case at bar, the court in its
order of September 24, 1959, with respect to the
residue ordered appellant:
"* * * to be held and used by him in accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of
Paragraph 8 of the Will."
In the Ehrngren case supra the court held:
"The executor was ordered by the court to
deposit this money as executor. The decree
was directed to the executor officially. The
decree being conclusive, and the court having
directed the executor what to do with the
fund in the execution of his duty under the
law, such order and decree must be complied
with, before the executor would be entitled
to his discharge from the obligation imposed
by the statute. His obligation, therefore, was
not ended, and the liability of his sureties was
not cancelled, until he had complied with the
order of the court, and deposited the bequest
as directed." Emphasis supplied.
The legislature of Utah has made it mandatory for a trustee not only to account but also to
produce vouchers or receipts. Even in states where
it is not mandatory under the statute to account,
the common law places the burden of proof on a
trustee to account and settle.
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In Georgia Code 113-2207 subs 6, 7 provides:
"A testator may by will dispense with the
necessity of inventory or returns, provided
there is no injury to creditors or third persons."
Utah has no such statute, yet the Georgia court
in Chapalas vs. Papachristos 195 S.E. 739 where the
testator in his will under Item 5 provided:
"I relieve him from making any inventory of
my property or appraisement, or from giving
any bond, and he is required only by his will
to probate and see that its terms are carried
out, and he is further relieved from making
any returns of his acts and doings to any
court whatever. Held, that this item of the
will did not render the execiitor unanswerable
in court in a proceeding by legatee for an accounting and settlement * * *" Emphasis
supplied.
The Supreme Court of Utah in Walker vs.
Walker 404 P 2d 253 17 U 2d 53 cites Wood vs.
Honeyman 169 P 2d 131, 171 ALR 587. The Wood
case held:
"19. We are completely satisfied that no
trust instrument can relieve a trustee from
his duty to account in a court of equity."
The court in the preceding paragraph in the
Wood case, to support its ruling quotes the follow-

mg:

"Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, S 972 says:
A settlor who attempts to create a trust
without court accountability in the trustee is
contradicting himself. A trust necessarily
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means rights in the cestui, enforcible in
equity. If the trustee cannot be called to account, the cestui cannot force the trustee to
any particular line of conduct with regard to
the trust property or sue for breach of trust.
The trustee may do as he likes with the property, and the cestui is without remedy. If
the court finds that the settlor really intended a trust, it would seem that accountability
in chancery or other court niiist inevitably f allow as an incident. Without an account the
cestui must be in the dark as to whether there
has been a breach of trust and so is prevented
as a practical matter from holding the trustee liable for a breach."
Still quoting the court in the Wood case, the following is taken from Scott on Trusts, § 172:
"Thus it has been held that a provision in a
will that the executors and trustees named
therein should not be obliged to file with the
surrogate any inventory is against public
policy, since to give effect to the provision
would remove the barriers designed to protect estates from misappropriations. Similarly
it has been held that where a husband transferred property to his wife in trust for the
support of their children, and provided that
she should not be required to account for the
expenditure of the property, the children can
maintain a suit against their mother to compel an accounting."
We quote once more from Bogert on Trusts
and Trustees, § 972 :
"If the settlor tries to reduce the accounting
duty of the trustee, either by providing that
26

the common-law duty shall be diminished or
by stipulating that it shall not be necessary
for his trustee to obey a duty to account expresed in statutory form, it would seem that
the effort should be invalid and the duty of
the trustee unaffected. The settlor ought not
to be able to oust the court of its constitutional or statutory jurisdiction, or to override the
acts of the legislature concerning information
to be furnished by trustees to their beneficiaries. Provisions of this sort in deeds or wills
would seem against public policy and void,
just as contract clauses to like effect are declared null." Emphasis supplied:
171 A.L.R. 631 This annotation cites other
cases holding that it is against public policy to relieve a trustee from making an account. Moreover,
the will of testator did not relieve testator from
accounting to the court.
POINT VI.
THE INTENTION OF THE TESTATOR MUST BE
ASCERTAINED FROM THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE
WILL.

Appellant has nowhere in its brief demonstrated that Paragraph 8 is in any way ambiguous. The
point above is a direct quote from Auerbach vs.
Samuels, 342 P 2d 879, also 95 C.J.S. Wills § 591.
Also In Re: Baum's Estate
294 p 2d 711
4 u 2d 375
"Elementary in the law of wills is that the
intention of the testator must govern. To ar27

rive at that intention courts must consider
the will in its entirety and not merely the
particular clauses which are in dispute."
In considering the four corners of the Will,
it will be observed that in Paragraph 7 of said Will,
which immediately precedes Paragraph 8, or the one
here under consideration, that the testator was very
articulate and was not lacking in words to express
his intention that with respect to the trust fund held
by A. C. Wallich under Paragraph 7, that A. C.
W allich should have the same as his sole, separate
property free of the trust, and said Paragraph 7 in
part provides :
"If any part of said money or if said property still remain in the trust, then he, the
said A. C. Wallich, shall have such remainder
of said property held by him in trust as aforesaid as his sole separate property free of the
trust herein imposed." Emphasis supplied.
Appellant now represents to this court that after
having drafted Paragraph 7 that the testator suddenly became inarticulate in the drafting of Paragraph 8 and unable to express his intention.
2
Extrinsic Evidence

All evidence attempted to be introduced by appellant in the lower court was inadmissable. 57
Am. Jur. 684, § 1053:
"Conversely, where the will expressly creates
a trust, extrinsic evidence is not cmnpeten t to
28

show the testator's intention to bequeath a
beneficial interest to the one named trustee."
In Re: Baum's Estate 294 P 2d 711 ____ U ----:
"4, 5 The rule that extrinsic evidence cannot be resorted to to dispute the testator's
recitals is not obviated by section 75-12-9,
UCA 1953 relied upon by petitioners . . . "
57 Am. Jur. 708, § 1107:
"Memoranda made by the testator at the time
of the execution of his will, and used by him
as the basis for its preparation, have, however, been held inadmissible to show that by
the word "surplus" in the residuary clause
the testator intended to include his real estate
as well as his personality."
Mahoney vs. Grainger 186 NE 87:
"(2-6) A will duly executed and allowed by
the court must under the statute of wills
(G. L. Ter. Ed. c. 191, § 1 et seq.) be accepted as the final expression of the intent of the
person executing it. The fact that it was not
in conformity to the instructions given to the
draftsman who prepared it or that he made a
mistake does not authorize a court to reform
or alter it or remould it by amendments. The
will must be construed as it came from the
hands of the testatrix."
95 C.J.S. 927, § 638:
"Testimony of the attorney who drew or advised the drawing of the will, the scrivener
who wrote it, or of the attesting witness to
the testator's signature, as to his understanding of what the testator intended by the terms
of his will is inadmissible."
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Last and most significant is the citation 94
ALR commencing at Page 1, with most significant
annotations at Page 257 through 291. All annotations from 257 to 291 directly show all evidence
submited by appellant is inadmissable; however,
if counsel would include all citations in this brief,
it would exceed the 50-page limitation since there
are over 34 pages of small print in that one portion
of said annotation alone.
POINT VII.
FRED R. WALLICH rs ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THAT THERE IS NO TRUST AND THAT THE
RESIDUE WAS A GIFT TO HIM PERSONALLY.

Said Fred R. W allich should be estopped from
asserting that there is no trust and that all the
residue is his sole, separate property under Paragraph 8 of said will for the following reasons:
1. Fred R. Wallich stipulated that an order
be entered that the residue and remainder be distributed as set forth in said petition and said petition provided that it be distributed to Fred R. Wallich "to be held and used by him in his discretion
in accordance with and· pursuant to the provisions
of Paragraph 8 of the will of the deceased."
2. The order of February 24, 1959 was entered distributing the property to Fred R. W allich,
''to be held and used by him in his discretion in
accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of
Paragraph 8 of the will of the deceased." Fred R.
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Wallich did not request that the court construe the
will and did not appeal from said order, which order
: was exactly as he stipulated it to be.
3. Fred R. W allich did sign and deliver and
file in court- R 199 - a sworn statement acknowledging receipt from the executor said residue "Fred
R. Wallich, trustee u/w Claudius Wallich, deceased
under the provisions of the order of the above-entitled court made and entered on the 24th day of
February, 1959, to hold, administer and dispose of
same as testamentary trustee and pursuant to the
provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Last Will and
Testament of Claudius Wallich, deceased." and signed a second receipt and filed the same with the
court, R 201, in similar words and figures. These
two receipts demonstrate that said Fred R. W allich
recognized that Paragraph 8 had been incorporated
into the court order and that he was therefore complying with the court order in accepting said property in trust and he is estopped from asserting
otherwise.
4. At R 158 Fred R. Wallich under his verified petition represented to the court that he received the residue as a testamentary trustee and intended to carry out said trust and that because said
stock certificates contained the language:
'"Trustee u/w Claudius Walich, deceased" that
he could not transfer any stock to pay for or carry
out the trust responsibilits under said will.
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R 158, the court made a finding that he made
such a representation declaring that he received
the property and that he represented to the court
that he would carry out the terms of the will which
he recognized had been incorporated in the court
order, and he should be estopped from asserting
otherwise.
5. Fred R. Wallich represented to the District
Court, in this very case, but involving Paragraph
7 of the Will, that he was a testamentary trustee of
the residue of this estate and that he could be called
upon by the beneficiaries to distribute to them under
said residuary trust R 357 and when they called
upon him in California, he claimed there was no
trust. See also R 95 where under his sworn statement Fred R. Wallich and his counsel represented
to the Court that there was $150,000.00 in this very
residuary trust they now deny. And he also made
representation to this Supreme Court that he was
"trustee of the residuary estated under the will of
Claudius Wallich, deceased." See exhibit attached to
the front page of this brief. The beneficiaries relied
upon such representations and Fred R. Wallich
should be estopped to now claim or contend that he
is not a trustee of said residue.
6. Since the beneficiaries under said trust pursued their remedy in California as they had to since
they could not obtain jurisdiction of said Fred R.
Wallich in Utah, he again represented to the Calif32

ornia court that he was a testamentary trustee and
as such should be entitled to conclude the matter in
' Utah on a petition he filed in Utah after action
had been commenced against him in California. See
R 291. He should, therefore, be estopped from asserting that he is not a testamentary trustee.
7. · In the very petition which he filed seeking his discharge as testamentary trustee and now
before this court, he asserts that he is a testamentary trustee and seeks discharge under a statute
providing for the discharge of testamentary trustees. See R 230. Such an assertion, in and of itself,
is so repugnant and incompatible with the holding
of both the legal and the equitable title in himself as
to be offensive to the administration of justice and
he should be estopped to assert he is not a testamentary trustee based on said petition for this
reason alone.
Although the lower Court had ordered Fred
R. W alich to account, before taking further action,
respondents were obliged to determine whether he
would comply with such order or appeal therefrom.
After Fred R. W alich appealed from said order respondents filed a verified petition asserting that
counsel for Fred R. W allich claimed that Fred R.
Wallich had lost $30,000.00 in the sale and transfer
of said Crown Zellerbach stock; and respondents alleged that Fred R. W allich was irresponsible wasting the assets of the trust estate and converting the
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same to his own use, that all his acts were in derogation of said trust and that said Fred R. W allich
should be required to account for $205,000.00 and
in such accounting he should not be allowed any
credit for any of said claimed loss, attorneys fees,
or other expenses. R 355 A.
Respondents in support of said petition filed
a memorandum of authorities which is on file before this Court. R 329.
Counsel for appellants refused to permit the
lower Court to hear said matter based upon a motion
that said Court was shorn of jurisdiction by reason
of this appeal. Considering all the circumstances
including the admonition of the California Court
that:
"If the Utah procedings are conducted in
good faith and with due diligence,"
also the fact that the beneficiaries have already been
compelled to retain counsel in Detroit, Los Angeles,
and Salt Lake City, after invoking equity juridsiction, the refusal of Fred R. Wallich to permit equity
to do complete justice obviously demonstrates his
intention not to conduct the Utah proceding in good
faith and with due diligence, and to the contrary
could well be considered by this Court as an attempt
on his part to obstruct the administration of justice.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, respondents pray that this
Court affirm the order of the lower Court in such
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manner as will impress appellant that Courts expect a fiduciary to realize the dignity and responsibility of his position and to conduct himself
accordingly. Counsel respectfully suggests that
such affirmation will have the effect of preventing
matters pertaining to the Wallich estate from becoming a perennial problem before the lower Court
the California Court and this Court; and will not
only aid in the administration of justice but save
needless expense and attorney's fees for the many
beneficiaries under said trust.
Respectfully submitted,

MARK & SCHOENHALS
E. L. SCHOENHALS
A tiorneys for Cross-Petitioner
and Respondents
903 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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